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Abstract 
“Classical” or “Dunantist” humanitarianism has traditionally been constructed around the 
core principles of neutrality (not taking sides) and impartiality (provision of assistance with 
no regard to ethnicity, religion, race or any other consideration, and proportional to need), 
plus the operational imperative (rather than a formal principle) to seek the consent of the 
belligerent parties. These principles, whilst never unchallenged, have dominated the 
contemporary discourse of humanitarianism and have been synonymous with or at least 
reflections of a presumed essential, enduring and universal set of humanitarian values. This 
paper offers a more dynamic and changing vision of the content of humanitarian action. It 
maps the origins and content of the “new humanitarian” critique of the humanitarian sector 
and principles and argues that this has both misrepresented the ethical content of neutrality 
and obscured what amount to significant operational adaptations that leave traditional 
humanitarianism well prepared for the contemporary operating environment.  
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 The dominance of the principles? 
 
During the Cold War, “classical” humanitarian principles1 clearly occupied a privileged place 
across a relatively homogenous, albeit fragmented, decentralized and limited humanitarian 
sector that was ostensibly rooted in the global North.2 They were enshrined in the declaratory 
positions of many of the major humanitarian agencies and were embedded in fundamental 
ways in the legalistic instruments of the humanitarian system itself: the Fundamental 
Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement), UN General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994 Code of Conduct). 3 
                                                        
1 This paper uses the phrases “classical”, “Dunantist” and “traditional” humanitarianism interchangeably and as 
a euphemism for the form of emergency, life-saving relief assistance and protection historically provided by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
2 Odeh defines the global North as the economically developed societies of Europe, North America, Australia, 
Israel, South Africa and others. He contrasts this with the global South, the “economically backward countries 
of Africa, India, China, Brazil, [and] Mexico amongst others”. He suggests that global North States are 
“wealthy, technologically advanced, politically stable and aging as their societies tend towards zero population 
growth”. The opposite is the case with global South countries. The global North “has continued to dominate and 
direct the global south in international trade and politics”. Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh, “A Comparative Analysis 
of Global North and Global South Economies”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
2010, p. 4. 
3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, Publication Ref. 0513, 1996, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0513.pdf; 
UNGA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991, available at: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm; 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and ICRC, Code of Conduct for the 
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Humanitarianism was also equated by the International Court of Justice with the work and 
modalities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 4  Variations of the 
principles also emerged in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster 
Response elements of the Sphere Project,5 and there have been various attempts to embed the 
principles at the field level by the United Nations (UN) and NGO coordination groups6 such 
as the Joint Policy for Operations in Liberia,7 the Ground Rules framework in Southern 
Sudan8 and the Strategic Framework in Afghanistan.9 As a result, the humanitarian principles 
have become more than simply a pragmatic mode of access to victims and closer to a motif of 
humanitarianism itself – they have been gradually elevated from a simple means for securing 
access to something that, for some, borders on being the “ends” of humanitarian action. This 
is not to say that the ICRC itself sees humanitarian principles as raised to the status of 
absolute values.10 Their more limited role as pragmatic guides was clear even to Jean Pictet, 
long considered the founding father of the Fundamental Principles of the Movement. He 
                                                                                                                                                                            
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, Geneva, 1994 (1994 Code 
of Conduct), available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf (all internet references 
were accessed in June/July 2015). 
4 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 243. 
5  The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 1998, 
available at: www.spherehandbook.org.  
6 Kate Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian 
Policy Group (HPG) Report No. 5, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), March 2000. 
7 Philippa Atkinson, The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis, Network Paper No. 22, Relief and 
Rehabilitation Network, ODI, 1997. 
8 Iain Levine, Promoting Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience, HPG Network Paper No. 
21, May 1997, p. 31. 
9 Antonio Donini, “Principles, Politics, and Pragmatism in the International Response to the Afghan Crisis”, in 
Antonio Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester (eds), Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace, and Justice 
in Afghanistan, Kumarin Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2004. 
10 Denise Plattner, “ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance”, International Review of the 
Red Cross, No. 311, 1996, pp. 161–180. 
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framed them as “a rule, based upon judgement and experience, which is adopted by a 
community to guide its conduct”. 11  But throughout most of the twentieth century the 
principles were variously constructed simultaneously as global, permanent and immutable 
talismans of access and as central motifs qua objectives of the humanitarian discourse. In 
many ways this ensured that challenges to classical humanitarianism as a paradigm of action 
could be routed through criticisms of the principles themselves.  
This paper follows two principal lines. Firstly, it raises the question of whether the 
humanitarian principles – of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality 12  – 
represent an authentic and fixed consensus on the nature and content of humanitarianism by 
situating them within a changing vision of the content of humanitarian action. It then maps 
the origins and content of the post-Cold War critique of the humanitarian system, and 
particularly the criticism of the principles levelled in the “new humanitarian” literature. It 
portrays this critique as the product of an alternative paradigm for assistance that poses an 
existential threat to humanitarianism through challenging both the ethical content and 
operational relevance of traditional humanitarian principles.  
The paper then deconstructs and evaluates the nature of these criticisms and in 
particular those levelled against the concept of neutrality. The paper questions whether the 
context of humanitarian action has changed to such a degree that the principles no longer 
remain the most effective means of guaranteeing access, suggesting that critics have both 
misrepresented the ethical content of neutrality and obscured what amount to significant 
adaptations within the classical system that (arguably) underline its continuing operational 
relevance. In fact, when operationalized consistently, the principles offer the best mode of 
                                                        
11 J. Pictet, The Fundamental Principles, above note 2, pp. 61–62. 
12 For further consideration of these Principles, see Jean Pictet’s basic works: Red Cross Principles, ICRC, 
Geneva, 1956, pp. 3.2–76; and The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, Henry Dunant 
Institute, Geneva, 1979, pp. 37–60. 
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access, but at the expense of the much broader aims of the new humanitarianism. The paper 
also argues that it is inevitable and beneficial that new humanitarian paradigms will emerge 
(and in fact already are emerging) alongside traditional humanitarianism, but the latter 
remains valuable and deserving of maintenance. 
 
 
A permanent humanitarian ethic? 
 
A particular component of the challenge to the principles has been the questioning of their 
continued relevance. Whilst the traditional principles undoubtedly have a definite air of 
permanence about them, many authors13 recognize their historical specificity, seeing them as 
products of a “particular geopolitical context, in which the only type of conflict was the 
classic inter-state conflict, with a clear separation of military and civilians, of relief and 
development assistance, and in which the sovereignty of a state was inviolable”.14 In many 
respects it is right to challenge whether particular visions of humanitarianism remain 
relevant, as it has never been entirely fixed in its content. Michael Barnett and Tom Weiss15 
stress this as its continuous evolution, arguing that “humanitarianism” has always represented 
                                                        
13 Madalina Elena Nan, “New Humanitarianism with Old Problems: The Forgotten Lesson of Rwanda”, Journal 
of Humanitarian Assistance, 4 October 2010, available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/780. See also 
Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Cornell University Press, New York, 
2001; Juliano E. M. Fiori, The Discourse of Western Humanitarianism, Institut de Relations Internationales et 
Stratégiques, 2013, available at: www.iris-france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/obs_questions_humanitaires/ENG-
JulianoEM-Fiori-october2013.pdf; Antonio Donini, “Decoding the Software of Humanitarian Action: Universal 
or Pluriversal?”, in Volker Heins, Kai Koddenbrock and Christine Unrau (eds), Humanitarianism and the 
Challenges of Cooperation, Routledge, London, forthcoming 2015. 
14 M. E. Nan, above note 13. 
15  Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread, 
Routledge, Oxford, 2011, p. 105. 
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a “work in progress”, with meanings and practices that have changed over the years and 
continue to do so.  
Humanitarianism’s fluid content reflects its nature as a socially constructed 
phenomenon manufactured by the interaction of compassion with human suffering. As Fiori 
argues, humanitarianism “reflects the politics of its time, and its relationship to suffering and 
vulnerability is a product of the specificity of the contemporary moment and the trajectory of 
historical currents leading up to that moment”.16 As a socially constructed phenomenon, ideas 
of humanitarian action have always reflected a highly fluid politics of compassion. From its 
origins in European enlightenment ideas of both community and individual freedoms through 
nineteenth-century social and religious movements seeking the abolition of slavery, Victorian 
prison reform, improvements to the conditions of the urban poor, enhanced medical care to 
the battlefield wounded, and improvements to the spiritual and social lives of colonial 
subjects in Africa, there has been an evolving domain in which a particular politics of 
compassion has regulated the boundaries and content of humanitarian action as well as the 
forms of suffering its institutions have been configured to address. Changes in this politics of 
compassion have arisen from the constant renegotiation of evolving notions of “inhumanity” 
and “suffering”, confronting equally fluid impulses towards solidarity, compassion and 
shared humanity. As a result, only some situations of “inhumanity” and “suffering” are ever 
transformed into “humanitarian crises” that are suitable for action by “humanitarian” actors. 
In other words, the content of humanitarianism has always been determined both by the 
supply of human suffering and the willingness to set boundaries around those forms of 
suffering that are considered “ripe” or “appropriate” for responses by a particular group of 
institutions that define themselves as “humanitarian”. In this sense, classical humanitarianism 
                                                        
16 J. E. M. Fiori, above note 13. 
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is constructed as a “paradigm” with its own institutions, bureaucracies, principles and 
repertoires of individual and collective action, a comprehensive model of understanding and 
interpreting reality that provides individual humanitarians with cognitive maps – viewpoints 
and rules – on how to look at problems and how to solve them. In effect, humanitarianism is 
also a mental script that helps to shape the priority and nature of key problems to be 
explained and the legitimacy of particular actions in responding to them. Also, because the 
norms of humanitarianism are embedded in social structures and bureaucracies, they are a 
currency or domain of power, empowering some institutions and individuals to promote 
particularistic individual as well as collective interests. As such, humanitarianism is a 
dominant discourse that maintains the dominance of particular institutions and modalities as 
well as defining the content of purportedly universal values of charity and compassion in 
specific types of situations of crisis that are labelled “humanitarian crises”. Arguably, as a 
socially constructed and exclusive domain, this inevitably generates challenges from within 
and without. Simply because dominant modes of power reflect particular interests and 
preferences, they inevitably create the potential for challenge by contenders who question the 
dominance of those very legitimizing institutions, norms and practices. 17  Hence the 
challenges posed by “new humanitarianism” in the 1990s were in part an inevitable, 
alternative and existential threat arising within the global North. The subsequent challenges 
from the rejectionists (in particular Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq), who 
see no place for humanitarian action unless it is within their own terms, and the broader 
challenges arising from the decline of the West and the emergence of different, mainly statist 
approaches to providing succour in times of crisis are equally inevitable. Whilst ostensibly 
                                                        
17 This is not to suggest that there are no differences; religiously inspired humanitarianism, Wilsonian traditions 
and military variations all have differing mental scripts. It is also interesting to note that “humanitarianism” has 
no equivalent in French, which refers to it not as an ideology but as an activity (l’action humanitaire). 
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dissimilar, these challenges have shared the tactics of questioning the ethical content and 
continuing relevance of traditional humanitarian principles. However, in the process of doing 
so they have obscured significant adaptations that have taken place within the domain of 
classical humanitarian ideas. 
 
 
An evolving or revolutionary paradigm? Broadening the politics of 
compassion 
 
The next part of the paper explores the way in which humanitarianism is socially and 
dynamically constructed. Notwithstanding a variety of roots, throughout most of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, humanitarian ideas and more importantly practices 
were dominated by an essentially charitable ethic of “giving”, while beneficiaries were 
deserving of help simply because of their status as victims and their capacity to generate pity. 
This implicitly equated classical humanitarianism with what David Rieff has described as 
“bed for the night humanitarianism”,18 a form of largely paternalistic and symptomatic relief 
rather than a transformative or emancipatory agenda for social change.19  
The geopolitical context of humanitarianism changed from the 1950s, and this had a 
significant impact on the ambition and nature of this particular politics of compassion. 
Decolonization processes, liberation struggles, the growth in the reach and resources 
available to the UN, and the rise of new logistics and information technologies accompanied 
and in many ways drove the increasing institutionalization of internationalized compassion, 
                                                        
18 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, Vintage, London, 2002. 
19 Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present”, in M. Barnett and 
T. G. Weiss (eds), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, Cornell University Press, New York, 
2008, pp. 1–48. 
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making it far more able to engage with distant venues of suffering in both an emotional and 
practical sense. Similarly, the rise of a powerful liberal discourse in the global North 
contributed to new perspectives on the nature, reach and purpose of humanitarian action and 
ideas of “proximity” to beneficiary and recipient communities. This was reflected in the 
growth of new types of humanitarian NGOs from the late 1960s, in particular the 
multiplication of solidarity movements, especially following the Biafran War, and NGOs 
dedicated to removing the deep structural causes of suffering and poverty.20 There was also 
an impact on the modes of humanitarian action: an increasingly strident liberal human rights-
based discourse in the global North saw the increasing numbers of NGOs as providers of 
broad-based solidarity rather than simply limited forms of essentially material support. This 
was augmented by an emancipatory vocabulary of rights,21 or what David Rieff describes as a 
“rights-based universalism”22 enshrined in an increasingly rights-based and avowedly activist 
humanitarianism which began to usurp that rooted in charity.23 Increasingly, suffering was 
expressed in terms of the violation of rights, and all acts of empowerment in terms of the 
protection, promotion or defence of those rights.24 As Kennedy contends, “efforts which 
cannot be articulated in these terms seem less legitimate, less practical, less worth the 
                                                        
20 J. E. M. Fiori, above note 13.  
21 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2004. 
22 David Rieff, “The Ruthless Luxuries of Peace”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2000. 
23 Stephen Hopgood, “Saying ‘No’ to WalMart? Money and Morality in Professional Humanitarianism”, in 
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, Cornell 
University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 98–123; D. Kennedy, above note 21; Larry Minear, The Humanitarian 
Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2002. 
24 Alpaslan Özerdem and Gianni Rufini, “Humanitarianism and the Principles of Humanitarian Action in Post-
Cold War Context”, in Sultan Barakat (ed.), After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the 
aftermath of Conflict, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, available at: 
www.terzomondo.org/writings/writings/Gianni_Rufini_2005_York_Humanitarianism_and_Principles.pdf.  
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effort”,25 reflecting authors such as Hugo Slim’s contention that philanthropy without rights 
threatens to reduce those suffering from disaster to pitiful victims who are unable to act 
against their own suffering. 26  The rights-based approach therefore sought to correct the 
powerlessness of those suffering, recognize their inherent rights and empower them to act as 
agents of their own change.27 This increasing focus on the realization of natural rights and 
broader visions of social and individual justice, rather than simply “pity and help”, broadened 
the politics of compassion, making “political space for itself to challenge, mitigate, and even 
transform the particular politics of violence and war”.28 In such a context, an emphasis on 
development aid and the protection of human rights (tools for the progress of peoples) that 
could challenge the structural causes of suffering, rather than simply address the symptomatic 
relief of suffering through humanitarian relief, became a natural component of the politics of 
compassion and challenged the compassionate minimalism inherent in traditional or classical 
humanitarianism – although ironically, this was something of a return to earlier campaigning 
forms of humanitarian action – such as the anti-slavery movement, Lord Byron’s Kouchner-
style agitation for the freeing of the Greeks from the Ottoman yoke, and other more or less 




                                                        
25 D. Kennedy, above note 21.  
26 Hugo Slim, “Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War”, International Affairs, Vol. 
79, No. 3, May 2003, pp. 481–501. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hugo Slim, “Not Philanthropy But Rights: The Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian Philosophy in War”, 
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002. 
29 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, Knopf, New York, 2008. 
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Broadening the conceptualization of crisis 
 
The changing ethical content of humanitarianism was accompanied by profound changes in 
the conceptualization of what constitutes humanitarian crises themselves. In the immediate 
post-Cold War period, disasters were increasingly recast as “complex emergencies” – or 
complex combinations of natural and man-made causes and diverse sources of 
vulnerability. 30  For the UN, complex emergencies were conceptualized as humanitarian 
crises in a country, region or society where there existed a total or considerable breakdown of 
authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which required an international 
response that went beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing 
UN country programme.31 Commonly, a long-term combination of political, conflict and 
peacekeeping factors was also involved.32 In effect the concept of the “complex emergency” 
transformed the short-term, sudden “innocence” of a “natural” disaster into a major complex 
political emergency, multi-causal in nature and demanding of a protracted and system-wide 
response. Increasingly, humanitarian catastrophes were tied both to conflict and to the 
existence of State and broader political failures. 
This conceptualization of crises as complex emergencies demanding comprehensive 
and coherent international responses focused increased attention on the poor performance of 
(mainly Western) organized humanitarianism as a whole. In many ways, this was not new. 
The failure to respond effectively and efficiently as a system had been the source of much 
                                                        
30 IFRC, World Disasters Report 2003: Ethics in Aid, IFRC, Geneva, 2003, available at: 
www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/world-disasters-report/wdr2003/.  
31 UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, 
28 June 2004, p. 8, available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/47da82a72.pdf.  
32 Mark Duffield, “Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism”, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4, 
October 1994, pp. 3–4. 
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controversy following the large-scale emergencies of the 1960s and 1970s: the Biafran War 
(1967–70), the Great Peruvian earthquake (1970), the Bhola cyclone in East Pakistan (1970) 
and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. This had already precipitated significant reforms of the 
UN’s humanitarian coordination structures. In 1971, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 2816,33 establishing the Disaster Relief Coordinator post and the UN Disaster 
Relief Organization (UNDRO). Despite what appeared to be a strong mandate to mobilize, 
direct and coordinate UN humanitarian assistance for natural disasters, and to coordinate UN 
assistance with the activities of non-UN actors, UNDRO was never able to effectively 
mobilize the UN’s humanitarian system and galvanize a coherent international response. 
UNDRO lacked the finances and personnel to translate its legal mandate into a robust 
coordination mechanism. Consequently, parallel, separate and ad hoc coordination 
arrangements emerged within and between UN departments and specialized agencies for 
specific humanitarian situations. These included little-remembered structures such as the 
Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) and the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA). 
Often these arrangements were inefficient, worked at cross-purposes or became vehicles or 
players in the competition for visibility and financial support. While it was often discussed 
previously, rationalization only occurred in the 1990s, starting on 19 December 1991with 
General Assembly Resolution 46/182,34 which created the UN Department for Humanitarian 
Affairs and the post of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and then only as a result of 
geopolitical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and the increased focus on 
systemic performance that derived from it.   
                                                        
33  UNGA Res. 2816 XXVI, 14 December 1971, available at: 
http://www.un.org/french/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2816(XXVI)&TYPE=&referer=http://ww
w.un.org/french/documents/ga/res/26/fres26.shtml&Lang=E.   
34 UNGA Res. 46/182, above note 3.  
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From poor performance to existential crisis? 
 
The early 1990s saw the critiques of humanitarianism change. The increasingly complicated 
environment of the complex emergency witnessed the habitual deployment of UN 
humanitarian organizations alongside the UN’s political and peacekeeping actors. In such a 
context the chronic shortcomings in the system’s performance became more obvious, both 
because the humanitarian response itself was frequently perceived internally as being poorly 
led and because coordination with other mission components was perceived as weak by 
political and military actors. Both the Gulf War of 1990–91 and the ensuing Kurdish refugee 
crisis at the Iraq–Turkey border highlighted the need for a dedicated and more empowered 
humanitarian coordination entity that was more able to effectively coordinate responses 
encompassing both internally displaced persons and refugee caseloads, and to improve the 
de-confliction between humanitarian agencies and deployed military forces. But it was the 
wars in the Balkans, the Great Lakes region and Somalia that led to a wave of political 
pressure for Western States’ militaries to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance but 
also to substitute humanitarian action for robust political and military interventions. The 
genocide and civil wars in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region in 1994 raised important 
questions about the international community’s willingness to act, the coherence of its 
responses and the overall levels of competence and professionalism within the humanitarian 
sector. Despite early warning of the impending genocide, the international community failed 
to act whilst the Joint Rwandan Evaluation35 drew attention to the belief that poorly managed 
                                                        
35  ODI, The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, London, June 1996, available at: 
www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=121184.  
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and unprofessional relief operations in the refugee camps following the genocide created 
conditions for a renewal of the conflict and led to thousands of what it described as avoidable 
deaths.36  
The necessity for enhanced humanitarian leadership also reflected demands for 
reform within the humanitarian community – in particular the need to formulate stronger 
policy and advocacy positions and develop a leadership that was able to safeguard the space 
for impartial, neutral and independent assistance in the maelstrom of politics that 
accompanied the increasingly “integrated” or “comprehensive” peacekeeping (and 
enforcement) missions of the first half of the 1990s. As a result of these failures and 
pressures, humanitarian action was increasingly characterized as chaotic, poorly managed, 
instrumentalized and ill-conceived; consequently, and crucially, it was also seen as becoming 





Undoubtedly, the international interventions in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, 
Sudan and Rwanda established conditions in which alternatives to the dominant modes and 
organization of humanitarianism could be considered.38 Humanitarian workers increasingly 
                                                        
36 John Eriksson, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, 
Synthesis Report, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996, p. 23, available at: 
www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/50189495.pdf. 
37 The Synthesis Report of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda refers to the “hollow core” 
of the humanitarian system: ibid., p. 31. On politicization in the 1990s, see Larry Minear, The Humanitarian 
Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2002, pp. 75 ff. 
38  Dorothea Hilhorst, “Being Good at Doing Good? Quality and Accountability of Humanitarian NGOs”, 
Disasters, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2002, pp. 193–212. 
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perceived themselves to be operating in different and profoundly complex environments in 
which a multitude of pressures undermined the effectiveness of humanitarian principles as 
guarantors of access, and even potentially transformed them into a moral liability whereby 
neutrality meant inaction or complacency in the face of human rights abuses or aid diversion 
that underpinned elements of the war economy. The perception of widespread abuses of 
rights and armed actors’ failure to uphold the laws of war provided a sense that the context of 
the so-called asymmetric “new wars” – that followed the end of the Cold War – was 
increasingly confounding civilian efforts to provide assistance. 39  The perceived 
instrumentalization and/or rejection of humanitarian assistance by belligerents appeared to 
subordinate needs-based humanitarianism to strategic political and military objectives and 
eroded the ability to provide impartial humanitarian assistance.40 The increasingly protracted 
nature of emergencies also highlighted the perceived role of external aid in fuelling conflict, 
prolonging war and escalating the levels of violence and suffering amongst civilians. 41 
Similarly, the sector’s lack of professionalism was portrayed as a blanket characteristic of 
classical humanitarian organizations themselves, contributing both to a growing sense of the 
inefficient use of aid resources for unaccountable and counterproductive programmes and the 
fuelling of conflict and abuse of aid through a lack of conflict sensitivity and adequate 
                                                        
39 It is difficult to say authoritatively that there are more abuses today than, say, fifty years ago, but much of the 
literature inspired by Mary Kaldor’s “new wars” thesis draws attention to an increase in violence and an 
increased ratio of civilian to military casualties. Mary Kaldor herself argues that the ratio of civilians to military 
casualties used to be eight combatants to one civilian killed in old wars, but that this has dramatically changed in 
new wars, where it is now approximately eight civilians to one combatant. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: 
Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 9. In addition to the increase in 
civilian casualties, it is argued that the new wars are “more bloody than any other kind of war since 1945”: 
Herfried Münkler, The New Wars, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 15. 
40 Kurt Mills, “Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in 
Contemporary Conflict”, Global Governance, Vol. 11, 2011, pp. 161–183. 
41 David Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New 
Humanitarian Agenda”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001, p. 681. 
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processes, effectively delivering perverse and unintended consequences contrary to the 
charitable spirit motivating much assistance.42 Similarly, the palliative nature of traditional 
humanitarianism, particularly where it fuelled crisis and conflict, 43  was increasingly 
portrayed as unsustainable, and the resort to humanitarian principles as an alibi for avoiding 
making difficult choices. Neutrality in particular became a “dirty word” within what was 
increasingly labelling itself as the “new humanitarianism”.44  Overall, the principles were 
characterized as leading to politically blind acts of charity where the act of giving was more 
important than delivering positive impact, which was itself made almost impossible by the 
very nature of complex emergencies. The classical formulation of humanitarian principles 
was increasingly portrayed by its critics as an anachronism left over from an inter-State 
system and the Cold War, at best irrelevant and at worst “untenable” and dysfunctional” in 
the face of new modes of warfare.45 
In contrast, the new humanitarianism – the alignment of humanitarian assistance more 
or less closely with Western liberal peace agendas46 – offered an extremely attractive vision 
of a potentially transformative approach able to address the structural conditions that 
                                                        
42 Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1999. 
43 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict”, International 
Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2003, pp. 79–109; Pierre Perrin, “The Impact of Humanitarian Aid on Conflict 
Development”, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 323, June 1998; S. Neil MacFarlane, “Humanitarian 
Action and Conflict”, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1999, pp. 537–561; Elena Lucchi and Clea Kahn, 
“Are Humanitarians Fueling Conflicts?”, Humanitarian Exchange, No. 43, June 2009, available at: 
http://odihpn.org/magazine/are-humanitarians-fuelling-conflicts-evidence-from-eastern-chad-and-darfur/; 
Philippe le Billon, The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know, Humanitarian Practice 
Network Paper No. 33, ODI, London, July 2000. 
44 Fiona Fox, “New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?”, Disasters, Vol. 
25, No. 4, 2002, p. 277. 
45 Thomas G. Weiss, Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?, Polity Press, London, 2013, p. 68. 
46 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, Zed 
Books, London and New York, 2001. 
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endangered populations. More importantly, it emerged as a “saving idea” in the protracted 
conditions of complex emergencies, offering to remedy the paradox that simply saving 
individuals today made little sense if they remained in jeopardy tomorrow.47  In such a 
context, an emphasis on development aid and the protection of human rights appeared to 
make infinitely more sense than stressing the palliative approaches of traditional emergency 
relief and material forms of humanitarian assistance, which often had only a symptomatic 
impact on contemporary forms of suffering in complex emergencies. 
From the horrors of the Rwandan genocide to the battlefields of Afghanistan, 
externally provided humanitarian assistance appeared caught between two identities: the one 
it sought entailed the operationalization of an agenda of a common humanity and universal 
solidarity, while the one with which it was rudely confronted was that of an instrument of 
political and economic agendas which delivered outcomes that ran directly counter to the 
explicit objectives of human philanthropy. There was a perception of a growing 
incompatibility between the humanitarian responses being proffered by the international 
community and the kinds of problems increasingly being encountered, and as a consequence, 
the challenge to humanitarianism evolved from a critique of its performance into a far 
broader challenge to humanitarian values48 and to the very idea that the sector was worth 
reforming at all.49 
In terms of reform, the new humanitarians sought change through programmes of 
both professional reform and standard-setting, but also the adoption of more political and 
                                                        
47 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 
2011, p. 105. 
48 Especially those associated with Dunantist principles encompassing the norms of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement. 
49 Joanna Macrae, “The Death of Humanitarianism? An Anatomy of the Attack”, Disasters, Vol. 22, No. 4, 
1998, pp. 309–317. 
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emancipatory forms of humanitarianism that offered a radical break from the past. The new 
humanitarianism promised to support transformative, developmental outcomes and even 
peacebuilding initiatives.50 In the words of Daniela Nascimento, it promised a “combination 
between the immediate needs and future development, reinforcement of local services and 
structures, empowerment, participation and enhancement of the population’s capacities, 
human rights promotion and protection (including gender issues) and contributions to 
peacebuilding”51. In particular, it extended humanitarian goals beyond the short-term saving 
of lives to include peacebuilding and State-building, the empowerment of minority groups 
and women, bridging the gap between relief and development, and ultimately incorporating a 
much broader rights-based approach. It also sought to change the focus on the humanitarian 
act – characterized as the charitable impulses of the giver or their compliance with 
humanitarian principles – to the rights of an empowered beneficiary seeking to realize rights 
to which s/he was entitled. Consequently, the new humanitarianism set out to expand the 
boundaries of both the types of “crises of humanity” addressed by humanitarian actors and 
the repertoire of “acts of compassion” that were considered appropriate for humanitarian 
actors. In effect, the incorporation of new conceptualizations of crisis, professional technical 
tools, standard-setting and emancipatory rather than palliative forms of assistance under the 
new humanitarian label promised a dramatic corrective to the challenges brought about by 
classical humanitarianism and enabled the new humanitarianism to portray itself as being 
capable of delivering a radical rupture with the past. This claim was bolstered in the early 
                                                        
50 M. Barnett and T. G. Weiss, above note 19. 
51 Daniela Nascimento, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Humanitarian Challenges and Dilemmas in Crisis 
Settings”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 2015, available at: 
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2126.  
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1990s by the post-Cold War, more interventionist posture52 of many Western States and by 
the consequent expansion of budgets for foreign and humanitarian aid.  
It should be noted, however, that not all segments of the humanitarian enterprise 
subscribed to the new humanitarianism. As a result, there have been intense and often 
increasingly polarized debates between “Wilsonian” and solidarist actors (who have adhered 
to the foreign policy objectives of their funders or espoused particular advocacy positions) 
and traditional “Dunantist” visions of humanitarian ideals.  
 
 
A new paradigm and new interests? 
 
The debates between traditional and “new” humanitarians are sufficiently polarized and the 
differences so profound that it is fair to describe the new humanitarianism as an insurgent 
idea which sought to replace classical approaches with its own vision – a new paradigm. The 
attraction of the idea, however, reflected not only the challenges of the post-Cold War era but 
also the interests of particular actors, particularly donors, Western governments’ State 
security actors and groups of NGOs that had been somewhat marginalized by the dominant, 
Western and essentially secular humanitarian institutions.53 The exponential growth in the 
numbers and diversity of such NGOs led to a rise in the numbers of multi-mandate 
organizations that co-opted the principles of classical humanitarianism but behaved in ways 
that differed fundamentally from the modalities of the ICRC. Many developmentally oriented 
                                                        
52  Such as the “ethical” foreign policy controversially pioneered by British prime minister Tony Blair’s 
government from 1998. 
53 The fault lines were, however, often fluid and dependent on individuals, issue and context. Also, the NGOs 
moved between these various camps over time, and the fault lines were often as much within as they were 
between organizations. 
Not final version. Please do not cite or circulate. 
The final version of this article will appear in International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 97, No. 897/8, 2015. 
 
 21 
NGOs were anxious to provide a form of normative legitimation to activities that actually fell 
outside of the traditional humanitarian framework in conditions where relief funding was 
growing partially at the expense of other forms of official development assistance. The 
explosion in overall NGO numbers also partially obscured the increasing importance of 
Western faith-based international NGOs such as World Vision and Catholic Relief Services 
in the broader pantheon of humanitarian actors. Some faith-based actors (from all religions 
and denominations) behaved in ways which were inconsistent with traditionally principled 
humanitarian action, particularly if they engaged in forms of proselytization, and were 
therefore uncomfortable both with efforts to establish coherence and with the implications for 
their work of upholding ideas of impartiality, independence and neutrality.  
Similarly, the new humanitarianism also promised much to donors, who were anxious 
both to halt the descent of crises into perpetual emergencies and to bridge the gap between 
relief and development. Following the Cold War, military doctrine and development policy 
converged on the assumption that underdevelopment was a powerful motor for national 
instability and consequently international insecurity. Similarly, while developmentalists 
recognized the need for conditions of “security” in order to facilitate development outcomes, 
military strategists increasingly considered development to be a fundamental component of 
stability and security. 54  This blending of development and security models blurred the 
boundaries between worlds that had increasingly been seen as separate, even if the historical 
relationship between the two had actually been one of great intimacy. Also, while post facto 
the process of blurring has often been characterized as that of the non-consensual and 
instrumental acquisition of development by security actors, the reality has in fact been far 
more complex and more consensual, with developmentalists pushing for access to the 
                                                        
54 M. Duffield, above note 46, p. 3. 
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increases in funding made possible by the association with security agendas and at times 
suggesting that rather than development being securitized, security could be humanized. In 
such a context, the new humanitarianism was drawn into a powerful vortex in which 




Dysfunctional principles? The contours of the critique 
 
Having identified the tensions between traditional Dunantist approaches and the more 
politicized new humanitarian agenda’s promise to address both the consequences and the root 
causes of crises, we now ask whether traditional humanitarianism is in fact reformable. 
Perhaps the most powerful element of the critique of classical humanitarianism is levelled 
against the central principle56 of neutrality, which Fiona Fox argues has “become a dirty 
word” amongst new humanitarians.57  
This line of critique certainly questions the moral foundation of classical 
humanitarianism. Authors such as David Chandler58 have rejected neutrality on the grounds 
that since conflicts are themselves a product of the chronic violation of human rights, 
humanitarianism should pursue a more expansive vision of good. Conflicts by their nature are 
constructed around victims and perpetrators; hence Fiona Fox argues that humanitarian action 
should not remain neutral between the “Serb militiamen and the Muslim civilians or between 
                                                        
55 Björn Hettne, “Development and Security: Origins and Future”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2010, pp. 
31–52. 
56 M. Barnett and T. G. Weiss, above note 19. 
57 F. Fox, above note 44, p. 277. 
58 D. Chandler, above note 41.  
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Hutu genocidaires and their Tutsi victims”.59 In a different piece, and citing former Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) president Phillipe Biberson’s reference to the ICRC’s refusal to 
compromise its neutrality by condemning human rights abuses, she quotes Biberson as saying 
that “if we are not sure that words can save, we do know that silence kills”.60  
 
Neutrality as moral apathy? 
 
Influential liberal authors and commentators such as Alex de Waal,61 Ed Vulliamy,62 Tim 
Judah,63 Martin Bell64 and Michael Ignatieff65 have all adopted similar arguments with regard 
to the neutral positions adopted by the international community in the Balkans and the 
Rwandan genocide, contending that adherence to the principle of neutrality, particularly by 
humanitarian actors, constitutes a form of complicity in the underlying crimes. Some 
explicitly argue that the ICRC’s refusal to make any form of critical public statement about 
the cost in human suffering of certain methods of combat or kinds of repression constitutes 
complicity. As a result, both Biberson and MSF (France) itself were content to call for an 
                                                        
59 F. Fox, above note 44, p. 277.  
60 Fiona Fox, “Conditioning the Right to Humanitarian Aid? Human Rights and the ‘New Humanitarianism’”, in 
David Chandler (ed.), Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2002, p. 26. 
61 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, James Currey, Oxford, 
1997. 
62 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War, St Martins Press, New York, 1994. 
63 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002. 
64 Martin Bell, In Harm’s Way, Icon Books, London, 1995 (revised ed. 1996). 
65 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, Metropolitan Books and 
Henry Holt, New York, 1998. 
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armed intervention to halt the genocide in Rwanda, as was Alex De Waal,66 that well-known 
critic of the “humanitarian international”.  
But even if these positions represent the high-water mark of the rejection of neutrality 
by elements of the liberal and humanitarian intelligentsias, it has often been suggested by 
new humanitarian practitioners that the very presence in the affected country of actors such 
as the ICRC casts a cloak of respectability on movements or authorities that are striving for 
recognition. Another frequently voiced criticism is that for some aid agencies, neutrality is 





But the maximalist criticisms described above are far from new accusations; rather, they 
reach back at least to the criticism of the ICRC’s (lack of) response to the Nazi concentration 
camps of World War II. The alternative to this position has often been equated with solidarity 
with the victim, an approach epitomized in the modus operandi of MSF and captured in its 
slogan of “Soigner et témoigner” (“Heal and witness”). While the solidarist position is still 
based on the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality, it appears 
far more cognisant of the potential for neutrality to equate to inactivity and is therefore, 
superficially at least, enormously appealing.68 However, this framing of the debate is itself 
misleading. It reflects a particular set of challenges relating to the mid-1990s, underestimates 
changes in the way in which the ICRC has managed this dilemma and also misrepresents the 
                                                        
66 A. de Waal, above note 61. 
67 Private interview with Sir John Holmes, former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, London, 23 November 2014. 
68 A. Özerdem and G. Rufini, above note 24.  
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implications of all interpretations of neutrality in key ways, particularly the relationship 
between moral principles and consequences.  
In terms of the latter, ethical debates have always considered the relationship between 
moral principles and desired ends, distinguishing between what are described as 
deontological and teleological or consequentialist positions. For example, when actions are 
judged morally right based upon their consequences, it is described as a teleological or 
consequentialist ethical theory.69 Such an approach privileges the consequences of an act in 
the moral calculus; hence, when we make choices that result in the correct consequences, we 
are acting morally, and when we make choices that result in the incorrect consequences, we 
are acting immorally. When actions are judged morally right based upon how well they 
conform to some set of independent moral rules or duties, it is described as a deontological 
ethical theory. Morality stems directly from following the dictates of duty, and when we fail 
to follow these, we are obviously behaving immorally. Thus, the prerequisite for making 
moral choices is an understanding of what our moral duties are. For instance, Immanuel 
Kant,70 an absolute deontological thinker, would argue that it is always wrong to lie, no 
matter what the consequences may be. 
Characterizing humanitarian agencies as either deontologically or teleologically 
rooted is challenging, as both positions are important and have their place in decision-
                                                        
69  For an excellent overview of the differences and similarities between deontological, virtue and 
consequentialist ethics, see Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit and Michael Slore, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate, 
Blackwell, Malden, MA, 1997; Hugo Slim, “Claiming a Humanitarian Imperative: NGOs and the Cultivation of 
Humanitarian Duty”, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, pp. 87–115; Hugo 
Slim, “Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political 
Emergencies and War”, Disasters, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1997, pp. 244–257; Hugo Slim, “Relief Agencies and Moral 
Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity”, Development in Practice, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, 2007, pp. 342–352. 
70 Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, trans. H. B. 
Nisbet, 2nd enlarged ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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making, but it would be reasonable to suggest that the ICRC’s position, rooted in behaving in 
accordance with humanitarian principles, is frequently conceived as equating most closely 
with the deontological perspective.71 While MSF’s erstwhile solidarist position has elements 
of both perspectives, the new humanitarianism is most clearly rooted in teleological 
perspectives and in this sense sees itself as occupying a different moral universe to that 




However, while the classification of institutions in this way partly explains the vitriolic 
debates that have raged between classical and new humanitarians, it does not accurately 
reflect contemporary interpretations of classical humanitarianism’s commitment to neutrality. 
Instead it can be argued that the new humanitarianism constructed a straw man of classical 
humanitarian ethics in which neutrality was portrayed as implicitly deontological and as 
necessitating the application of a range of duties derived from the humanitarian principles 
themselves. Arguably this led to an implicit sense that traditional humanitarians, and the 
ICRC in particular, engaged in visceral, unreflective and unthinking forms of charity and 
philanthropy that amounted to a denial of politics and favoured the application of the 
principles as the primary benchmark of success. In effect, the principles were portrayed by 
the new humanitarians as having become sovereign, leading to a misplaced argument that the 
principles and the ICRC’s working methods had been elevated to a status that was more 
important than addressing the suffering of the human beings that it was duty-bound to 
                                                        
71 A. Özerdem and G. Rufini,  above note 24.  
Not final version. Please do not cite or circulate. 
The final version of this article will appear in International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 97, No. 897/8, 2015. 
 
 27 
relieve.72 Equally, from this perspective questioning the moral value of the principles of 
universality, humanity and neutrality resulted in a different moral calculation73 – namely, that 
speaking out only in selected cases was wrong. If all suffering is considered to be genuinely 
equal, it is incumbent on the ICRC to speak out and denounce the pernicious effects of 
doctrines and ideas that lead to such appalling levels of misery and death.  
However, whilst this critique is a powerful one, it can also be applied to most if not all 
of the Western relief agencies in the 1990s. In these contexts many agencies privileged their 
delivery of material assistance in ways that were decidedly unreflective and deontological in 
approach. This is not to say that the ICRC has been innocent of deontological approaches. 
Undoubtedly in the ICRC’s past, and despite Pictet’s very focused sense of their practical 
rather than ideological nature, the humanitarian principles have enjoyed a revered status both 
within and without the organization. In fact, it would be strange if a hierarchical and 
essentially Swiss bureaucracy did not coalesce firmly around such principles and police their 
application; after all, they have conferred significant normative legitimacy both on the 
organization and in the construction of professional and personal identities amongst 
humanitarians. But deontological ethics are no longer as compatible as they once were with 
postmodern societies. European society has undoubtedly become less hierarchical, more 
individualistic and less supportive of rigidly prescriptive ethical codes, and Swiss society has 
not been immune to these changes. The growing professionalization of ICRC staff and the 
impact of media and internet scrutiny have had significant consequences for the organization. 
Consequently the ICRC has been forced, like other humanitarian bureaucracies, to adapt to 
the increasing challenges of complex and protracted emergencies by being more reflective 
                                                        
72 Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, Sword and Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises, 
Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2006. 
73 See above note 3 for an identification of humanitarian principles and those applying solely to the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
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and responding to crises in more nuanced ways. As a consequence, the organization has 
increasingly engaged in more “thoughtful” forms of humanitarian response, incorporating its 
own forms of conflict analysis, do-no-harm prescriptions and teleological calculations in 
much the same way that advocates of the new humanitarianism have argued characterizes 
change within their own paradigm.74  
This teleological adaptation can be seen most clearly in the application of the 
principle of neutrality. Marion Harroff-Tavel 75  implicitly but firmly argues against the 
deontological understanding of neutrality that is presumed to characterize traditional 
humanitarianism, solidly rebutting the idea that the ICRC considers its principles and 
working methods to be more important than its duty to relieve the suffering of human beings. 
She characterizes the purpose of neutrality as meaning “standing apart from contending 
parties or ideologies, so that everyone will trust you”,76 and echoes Pictet in her construction 
of neutrality as a utilitarian instrument rather than ethical position – “a means to an end, not 
an end in itself”.77 The concealed nature of the ICRC’s deliberations on neutrality also leads 
to the incorrect assumption that neutrality can be equated with “being silent, indifferent, 
passive, and even cowardly”. 78  In a direct echo of the solidarist positions of the new 
humanitarianism, she argues that the alternatives “overlook the fact that the Movement must 
never be neutral towards human suffering, but always towards men who are fighting each 
                                                        
74 Rony Brauman, “Médecins Sans Frontières and the ICRC: Matters of Principle”, International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 888, 2012. 
75 Marion Harroff-Tavel, “Neutrality and Impartiality: The Importance of these Principles for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them”, International Review 
of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, 1989, p. 540.  
76 Ibid., p. 540. 
77 Ibid., p. 540. 
78 Ibid., p. 539. 
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other and towards the differences that divide them”.79 Here solidarity is expressed in terms of 
continuing to function in situations where suffering is rife. This interpretation of neutrality is 
decidedly teleological and consequentialist in its ethics: 
 
Neutrality does not always mean keeping quiet; it means keeping quiet when to say 
anything would inflame passions and provide material for propaganda without doing 
any good to the victims the movement is trying to help. It requires common sense. 
There is unfortunately no standard way of distinguishing between what can be said 
and what should not be said. Every case and situation is different from those of the 
past.80 
 
But the ICRC is adamant that the consistent application of humanitarian principles continues 
to make the organization acceptable in situations where armed actors 
 
would never let it in if they feared that it would disclose information of use to their 
opponents. For example, the ICRC considers that its reports on its visits to places of 
detention, and the recommendations contained in those reports, are for the 
confidential information of the authorities to whom they are submitted.81  
 
The ICRC’s ambitions to intervene in situations that go beyond its formal legal mandates in 
the more conventional forms of inter-State war also encourage significant caution on its part. 
In situations of internal disturbances and tensions, States and non-State armed groups are not 
                                                        
79 Ibid., p. 539. 
80 Ibid., p. 540. 
81 Ibid., p. 540. 
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under a direct international humanitarian law (IHL) obligation to accept the ICRC’s presence; 
instead, the organization has an extremely fragile mandate by virtue of its own Statutes and 
those of the Movement as a whole, as well as its global reputation for discretion. This creates 
a particular form of teleological “politics of discretion” as opposed to the apolitical and 
deontological application of a principle as a duty, which, while perhaps not precisely 
apolitical, arguably has a certain blindness to the ways in which local politics are constructed. 
The process involves a delicate balancing act that is nicely framed by Etxeberría,82 quoted in 
Alp Ozerderm and Gianni Rufini’s excellent article,83 through two related scenarios. The first 
asks whether, if a humanitarian agency is aware of gross human rights abuses by authorities 
and armed factions, it should denounce them publicly, which might lead to the organization’s 
expulsion from its area of operations and therefore an increase in the suffering of its targeted 
population, or ignore those abuses as the trade-off for ensuring the continuation of its 
programmes. The second asks whether a humanitarian agency should accept some complicity 
with local militias in its area of operations in order to ensure the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to civilians – and if it does, what would this mean to the integrity of the twin 
principles of impartiality and neutrality? In effect, the necessity for confidentiality84 leaves 
the ICRC with a severely constrained set of choices that present it with an extremely 
challenging ethical dilemma: it can only choose to cease its operations if its recommendations 
to the belligerents consistently have no impact, but this would leave unprotected the very 
persons that it strives to help, and there is little guarantee that withdrawal would lead to a 
change in the abusers’ behaviour anyway. But this is not to say that adherence to this form of 
                                                        
82 Xabier Etxeberría, “The Ethical Framework of Humanitarian Action”, in Reflections on Humanitarian Action: 
Principles, Ethics and Contradictions, Pluto Press, London, 2001. 
83 A. Özerdem and G. Rufini, above note 24. 
84 See Memorandum, “The ICRC’s Privilege of Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information” in this issue of the 
Review. 
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discretionary politics prevents other bodies – humanitarian organizations, churches, 
journalists, and any other individual or organization concerned – from bearing witness and 
publicly exposing the repression to which those people are subjected. In fact, the achievement 
of improved outcomes for “humanity” relies precisely upon this division of labour. However, 
the ICRC’s day-to-day mission85 is simply to preserve individual human beings from bodily 
harm and personal indignity, not to resolve all of the problems of an “inhumane” condition. It 
has the complex and extremely delicate task of maintaining negotiations  
 
with authorities or movements guided by political or ideological considerations that 
are often far from humanitarian. Its strength resides in its self-imposed limitations. It 
refuses to enter into ideological controversy, to express condemnation or approval, to 
say on which side justice lies. It takes sides only with the victims, and works actively 
and pragmatically to alleviate their plight.86 
 
The politics of discretion and confidentiality 
 
Not only is this “politics of discretion” resplendent with its own ethical challenges, but it also 
generates new problems of credibility in demonstrating that the ICRC’s own pursuit of 
neutrality does not prevent the organization from expressing its concern with regard to 
violations of IHL. In effect, the ICRC has difficulty demonstrating that its strategic decision 
to remain publicly silent is legitimately rooted in calculations of discretion and 
                                                        
85 This is not to suggest that the ICRC has no role in other, broader activities, such as prevention. 
86 M. Harroff-Tavel, above note 75, p. 542. 
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confidentiality rather than illegitimately resulting from the dogged pursuit of neutrality.87 
Because the future is inherently unpredictable, it is impossible to determine in advance 
whether better consequences will result from remaining silent rather than disengaging. 
Furthermore, the particular optics of crisis decision-making privilege visible changes in 
direction, or “loud decisions” in response to “loud” and consistent abuses, while the ICRC’s 
silence in the face of continued and systematic abuses suggests to many a failure on the part 
of the international community as a whole to pull out all the stops, creating the risk that the 
organization will become a convenient symbol of international inertia and amorality. Hence, 
the ICRC has a tendency to be viewed as a prisoner of what appear to be status quo decisions 
by remaining engaged with abusers but publicly silent regarding their abuses. In effect, it 
lacks the ability to explain its position in a way that provides ethical credibility in the arena of 
public morality. 
The lack of equivalence between remaining engaged and visible forms of 
disengagement should come as no surprise. One of John F. Kennedy’s favourite quotations, 
based upon a misinterpretation of Dante’s Inferno, elaborates on the risks of a neutral 
position: “The hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who in time of moral crisis 
preserve their neutrality.”88 Whilst not actually found anywhere in Dante’s work, it is based 
upon a scene in the third canto of the Inferno. In this scene,  
 
Dante and his guide Virgil, on their way to Hell, pass by a group of dead souls outside 
the entrance to Hell. These individuals, when alive, remained neutral at a time of great 
moral decision. Virgil explains to Dante that these souls cannot enter either Heaven or 
                                                        
87  For an explanation, see Memorandum, “The ICRC’s Privilege of Non-Disclosure of Confidential 
Information” in this issue of the Review. 
88 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, John F. Kennedy’s Favorite Quotations, available at: 
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Hell because they did not choose one side or another. They are therefore worse than 
the greatest sinners in Hell because they are repugnant to both God and Satan alike, 
and have been left to mourn their fate as insignificant beings neither hailed nor cursed 
in life or death, endlessly travailing below Heaven but outside of Hell.89  
 
However, the ICRC’s position is not one of moral ambivalence. Far from being a sin of 
omission, it is a position that remains based in pragmatic calculations of access. In some 
ways this calculation is made easier by the rapid growth in media outlets, which increases the 
probability that moral outrages will be publicized without the ICRC taking an active part. The 
ICRC has also invested considerably in identifying the conditions under which it can make 
public statements concerning violations of IHL applicable in armed conflicts, in part to make 
sure that any resulting statements can be defended as something clearly other than political 
opportunism and silence can be seen to imply that the calculus of humanitarian benefits 
remains, for the time being, stacked in favour of public silence and private advocacy.90  
However, it is clear that neutrality, alongside “discretion”, remains a difficult concept 
to legitimize, despite the argument that the ultimate goals of humanitarian action and the 
rights-based approaches of the new humanitarianism ultimately overlap and are therefore 
analytically compatible, 91  even if they do represent different forms and strategies of 
humanitarianism. Rather than providing alternatives, James Darcy believes that the rights-
based approach and humanitarianism share a common concern for protecting people from 
                                                        
89 Ibid.  
90  See ICRC, “Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Event of Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law or of Other Fundamental Rules Protecting Persons in Situations of Violence”, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 858, 2005, available at: 
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_858_violations_ihl.pdf.  
91 See James Darcy, “Locating Responsibility: The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Its Rationale”, Disasters, 
Vol. 28, No. 2, 2004, p. 15; H. Slim, above note 28. 
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violence, and the belief that IHL should be upheld and that those who break it should be held 
accountable. However, despite this theoretical consistency, neutrality comes with a 
significant price. As Duffield eloquently states, hinting at its inability to ultimately deliver 
transformative social outcomes, “the insistence that humanitarianism is ‘neutral’ and separate 
from politics, means that humanitarians can only grasp human life as bare life”.92 Alain 
Desthexe, former secretary-general of MSF and writing in his personal capacity, points to the 
incompatibility of even more limited forms of justice and neutrality by warning against the 
widespread adoption of the principle:  
 
The humanitarian world needs only one neutral organization: the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is essential and quite sufficient …. Private 
humanitarian action must break free from the double yoke of simple compassion and 
neutrality and arm itself with a demand for justice.93 
 
Perhaps the core conclusion to draw from this debate is that the diversity found within 
humanitarianism has some positive aspects. Despite the oft-repeated remark by Sir John 
Holmes, former undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief 
coordinator (2007–2010), that the humanitarian system “is not a system in any recognisable 
state” but “a haphazard collection of organisations”,94 the inherent variety of positions can 
have beneficial effects. However, while in some situations the blooming of a thousand 
flowers is positive, in others the mélange de genres is potentially confusing and dangerous. 
                                                        
92 Mark Duffield, Carry On Killing: Global Governance, Humanitarianism and Terror, Danish Institute for 
International Studies Working Paper No. 13, 2004, p. 23. 
93 Alain Desthexe, Rwanda: Essai sur le génocide, Éditions Complexe, Brussels, 1994, p. 87. 
94 Quoted in Paul Cornish, Humanitarian Response and International Engagement in Fragile States, Report of 
the Canada–UK Colloquium, West Sussex, 1–3 November 2011, p. 19.  
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There are two issues here. One is that you don’t necessarily have to be neutral to do good 
humanitarian work (in some situations), and that multi-mandate organizations, faith-based 
groups, solidarists and even (in some situations) the military can do useful work. The other is 
that pretending to be who you are not (e.g., a multi-mandate NGO in Afghanistan claiming to 
be humanitarian) is a recipe for confusion or worse. Also, positions taken have consequences 
over time: the context changes, and yesterday’s alignments can be tomorrow’s pitfalls. 
Hence, more clarity and perhaps even a clearer bifurcation between Dunantists and the 
variegated others would be a good thing. 
 
 
Access debates and principles 
 
While adherence to the principle of neutrality is not as ethically damaging as the new 
humanitarians would have us believe, this still leaves their challenge that circumstances and 
“new wars” have rendered it an impractical instrument for gaining access. In practitioner 
debates, much has been made of the rising incidents of humanitarian agency targeting and the 
resulting contraction of humanitarian space. However, there is an alternative perspective. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the blurring of boundaries between humanitarian, political and 
military choices, the increasing number of attacks on humanitarian organizations and the 
fragmentation of armed actors in many complex emergencies all create a highly complex and 
dangerous environment, humanitarian principles continue to be essential to the ICRC’s 
ability to function, though they have clearly demanded significant investment in new 
resources.95  
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Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, pp. 173–188. 
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Looking beyond the increasing numbers of violent attacks against aid workers and 
yearly rising casualty tolls, the empirical data puts into question the raw assumption that the 
principles are redundant. The evidence undoubtedly depicts a dramatic rise in violence 
against aid workers from 143 victims in 2003 to 460 in 2013, but it is important to note that 
only five countries – Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan – accounted for 
75% of all attacks.96 That points to a concentration of incidents within high-violence contexts 
rather than a tendency applicable to all humanitarian activities. In these, the most dangerous 
of settings, the majority of attacks can either be attributed to banditry, as was common in 
Sudan, or to politically oriented efforts to pursue national aims, as in Afghanistan by the 
Taliban and other insurgent groups.97  This implies not only that humanitarian personnel 
become in many cases victims of criminality or nihilistic violence, but also that “security 
incidents suffered by aid agencies are due to foolish mistakes by ill-prepared individuals, and 
to faulty appraisals of local conditions”.98 Both Pierre Gassmann and Fiona Terry conclude 
that the ICRC was able to remain active in such situations due to its long-standing adherence 
to humanitarian principles and its investment in constructing consent amongst the 
increasingly fragmented armed actors and local communities.99 In Terry’s analysis of the 
ICRC’s operations in Afghanistan, she argues that while many humanitarian actors 
                                                        
96 Aid Worker Security Report, Unsafe Passage: Road Attacks and Their Impact on Humanitarian Operations, 
2014, available at: 
https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/Aid%20Worker%20Security%20Report%202014.pdf. 
97 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria Di Domenico, Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 
Update Trends in Violence against Aid Workers and the Operational Response, HPG Policy Brief No. 34, April 
2009, available at: 
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98 Ibid.  
99  Pierre Gassmann, “Rethinking Humanitarian Security”, Humanitarian Exchange, No. 30, June 2005, 
available at: www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-30/rethinking-humanitarian-security; 
Michael Khambatta, Humanitarian Space and Stability Operations, Edges of Conflict Working Paper, 2009, 
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abandoned neutrality as a guiding principle, the ICRC persevered and, through some 
innovative and sometimes risky initiatives, managed to show both sides the benefits of 
having a neutral intermediary in conflict. As a consequence, the ICRC has been able to 
continue to expand its humanitarian action in Afghanistan. 100  This was also the case in 
Kosovo, where the refusal by the ICRC to rebuke Serb atrocities contributed to Milošević’s 
decision to allow the ICRC to negotiate access to Serbia. The ICRC was the only 
international humanitarian body assisting the victims of NATO bombings in Serbia. In light 
of this, Cornelio Sommaruga argues that the “humanitarian endeavour and political action 
must go their separate ways if neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work are not to be 
jeopardized”.101  
It is also the case that attacks on ICRC staff did not register significant increases 
between 2003 and 2013.102 Hence one can argue that the ICRC’s increased investment in 
effective acceptance and humanitarian negotiation strategies (alongside high-quality and 
relevant programmes) has enabled it to remain in spaces that are closed to other agencies – 
even whilst recognizing that humanitarian principles still, as historically has always been the 
case, do not guarantee universal access by all warring parties. 103  In effect, the ICRC’s 
pedigree of providing predictable, reliable, independent and discrete forms of humanitarian 
action in many highly polarized and fragmented conflicts, plus its investment in 
manufacturing and maintaining consent amongst numerous localized armed actors, has 
                                                        
100 See also Marcos Ferreiro, “Blurring of Lines in Complex Emergencies: Consequences for the Humanitarian 
Community”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 24 December 2012, available at: 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1625.  
101  “Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations 
Organization”, Statement by Mr Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, at the UN General Assembly, 
New York, 20 November 1992, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 33, No. 292, 1993, pp. 49–56. 
102 Aid Worker Security Report, above note 96.  
103 P. Gassmann, above note 99.  
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enabled it to remain clearly distinct from all political and military actors and even many other 
forms of humanitarian actor. Besides the ICRC, and to a lesser degree MSF, few if any 
humanitarian organizations routinely make the organizational investments necessary to build 
these required capacities in risk management. 104  This supports Jansen and Hilhorst’s 105 
argument that rather than spontaneously manifesting as a consequence of humanitarian 
principles, humanitarian space is socially negotiated between a wide range of actors that 
shape the emergence of this space. In this process, “humanitarian” actors (broadly defined) 
employ the principles and the idea of humanitarian space to increase the probability of safe 
access. Consequently, increasing engagement in high-profile, complex, volatile and fraught 
environments without appropriate capacities in risk management and negotiation strategies 
may have a significant part to play in explaining the security challenges faced by the 
humanitarian sector, rather than a simple association with Western geopolitical interests and 
the rise of barbarity.106 Similarly, in an age of mass media, multi-mandate organizations may 
find it more difficult to establish trust and credibility if they have manifestly failed to uphold 
commitments to humanitarian principles on a global scale even whilst claiming to do so. 
  
 
Principles, power and geopolitical shifts: The challenge of universality 
 
                                                        
104 Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer and Abby Stoddard, To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in 
Complex Security Environments, OCHA Policy and Studies Series, Policy Development and Studies Bureau, 
New York, 2011. 
105 Dorothea Hilhorst and Bram J. Jansen, “Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday 
Politics of Aid”, Development and Change, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2010, pp. 1117–1139. 
106 Cynthia Brassard-Boudreau and Don Hubert, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on 
Security and Access”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2010, available at: 
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Whilst the principle of neutrality has undoubtedly been controversial, there are parallel issues 
with the universality of the principles – and the way in which it relates to the new 
humanitarianism. Arguably the discourse relating to the principles has tended to presume the 
existence of a meaningful “global humanitarian community” that is bound by standards and 
linked by technology and networking. 107  But to what extent can we say that such a 
humanitarian community actually exists? Even though the majority of agencies within the 
“sector” have made reference to the humanitarian principles, Fiori notes that there has been a 
“significant divergence between them on how they are conceived and how they are applied”. 
Moreover, outside of the “sector”, other principles are often given primacy over “core 
humanitarian principles”. In South-East Asia, neutrality and independence have been seen as 
secondary to the principle of non‐interference. In China, where the notion of the State as 
guarantor of the welfare of its people is grounded in Confucian tradition, the independence of 
humanitarian agencies from governments is not considered to be necessary, desirable or even 
possible. In fact, Hirono argues that the ideal of a well-ordered State is one of the three 
central features of Chinese humanitarian ideas.108 Similarly, in Japan, Osa argues that the 
social predisposition to view that State as the most legitimate provider of both social and 
humanitarian services shapes the content of Japanese overseas humanitarianism and the 
delivery of assistance. 109  And in Latin America, support for those affected by conflict, 
                                                        
107  Peter Walker and Catherine Russ, Professionalising the Humanitarian Sector, Enhanced Learning and 
Research for Humanitarian Assistance, April 2010, available at: 
www.elrha.org/uploads/Professionalising_the_humanitarian_sector.pdf.  
108 Miwa Hirono, “Three Legacies of Humanitarianism in China”, Disasters, Vol. 37, 2013, pp. 202–220; Hanna 
B. Krebs, Responsibility, Legitimacy, Morality: Chinese Humanitarianism in Historical Perspective, ODI, 
September 2014, available at: www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9139.pdf.  
109  Yukie Osa, Seeking Japanese Conceptions of Humanitarianism, paper contributed to the Cultures of 
Humanitarianism: Perspectives from the Asia-Pacific project, October 2012, available at: 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/iaps/documents/project/osa.pdf.  
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extreme poverty and disaster “has often been guided by a solidarity that precludes neutrality 
and impartiality”.110 
In many respects, the claim that principles are universal is based on a pretence that 
humanitarian principles and compassion are universal and separate from issues of global 
governance. But during the post-Cold War period it has become clearer that humanitarianism 
has transformed from being something of an “epiphenomenon” of international relations into 
being, as Vincent Bernard argues,  
 
a support for the projectionist will of certain states, including some emerging 
countries. Its future will depend on the evolution of crises and of political and military 
actors, but also on its own ability to enhance its quality, its principles, and in 
particular its independence vis-à-vis donors and recipients.111  
 
 Without restating the arguments as to whether human rights are locally or universally 
conceived, it is reasonable to say that humanitarian principles in the hands of multi-mandate 
NGOs and the UN system have become consubstantial with forms of State, epistemic and 
cultural power. As such they are only very partially acceptable outside the Western world, 
particularly given the rise of the new humanitarian’s emphasis on rights.   
The argument goes like this: the process of extension of the Western model, which we 
label, inter alia, “coloniality”, is seen as an exclusively European phenomenon that has 
spread with modernity.112 Starting from the Renaissance, it spread around the world through 
                                                        
110 J. E. M. Fiori, above note 13.  
111 Vincent Bernard, “The Future of Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 
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the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, scientific discoveries, and of 
course the web-like expansion of the capitalist system. In this way, the myth of Eurocentrism 
identifies European particularity with universality tout court.113 Coloniality undermines the 
coexistence of diverse ways of producing and transmitting knowledge because it orders all 
forms of human knowledge on an epistemological scale from the traditional to the modern, 
from barbarism to civilization, from the community to the individual, from the North to the 
South, the West to the East. By way of this strategy of epistemic colonization, European (and 
later, Western) scientific thought has positioned itself as the only valid form of producing 
knowledge. The West thus acquired an epistemological hegemony over all the other cultures 
of the world. Quijano ends this argument with the natural consequence: if knowledge is 
colonized, the task ahead is to decolonize knowledge. This epistemic decolonization could be 
achieved either by de-linking from the Western canon or by its implosion and the emergence 
of a “pluriversality” of systems of knowledge, in this case the emergence of differing forms 
of humanitarian ideas and practice.114 
In the past fifteen years or so, humanitarianism and humanitarian action have seen a 
rise in scholarly analysis aimed at understanding the functions they perform in North–South 
relations, world ordering and the promotion of liberal peace 115 . While much has been 
uncovered about how political and humanitarian agendas tend to reinforce each other, it is 
necessary to dig deeper into the nature of humanitarianism by looking at how – as a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
studies, most prominently by Anibal Quijano. See Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality”, 
Cultural Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2–3, 2007, pp. 168–178; Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western 
Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2012.  
113 Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power, The New Press, New York, 2006. 
114 V. Bernard, above note 111. 
115 For example, M. Duffield, above note 46; Didier Fassin, La raison humanitaire: Une histoire morale du 
temps present, Gallimard and Seuil, Paris, 2010; Antonio Donini, “The Far Side: The Meta Functions of 
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discourse, an ideology, a set of institutions and professions, and a political economy – it is 
deeply embedded in a system of knowledge that professes to be universal but is in reality an 
extension of European and Western hubris. What Mignolo calls the “Western code” is the 
hidden software of modernity. It is the patron de poder, the matrix of power. 116  It is 
predicated on the assumption that it is the only game in town and that as the modern 
(capitalist) system expands, the code replaces all other primitive, non-Western and non-
modern codes; hence the inherent coloniality of the code, and by extension the inherent 
coloniality of all aspects of dominant relations – economic, cultural, developmental – 
between the North and the South, including the humanitarian endeavour. According to 
Mignolo and other “coloniality thinkers”, this Western epistemic code still undergirds the 
processes through which the world is conceptualized, including both liberal and anti-
capitalist critiques of the model, and therefore much of current humanitarianism.117 
The implication of the process is that as long as the West was rising, its epistemic 
dominance was broadly acceptable. However, now that the East and other centres of power 
are on the ascendant, the West’s dominance is becoming more problematical.  Many of the 
new or emerging powers have no obligation, nor perhaps the inclination, to conform to the 
boundaries of the traditional humanitarian sector. Indeed, they can, and often do, define 
“humanitarian” in their own terms, not feeling obliged to follow the structures created by the 
dominant humanitarian sector – hence the criticism of humanitarian principles coming from 
non-Western States. Some even postulate the emergence of an “Eastphalian” approach to the 
incorporation of relief for those affected by conflict and crisis into statist political agendas118 
(not that Westphalian states were innocent of instrumentalizing it, of course). The West, for 
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118 On the intriguing concept of “Eastphalia” as an alternative to the traditional Westphalian concept of the 
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its part, has also participated in undermining the principles through the “global war on terror” 
by press-ganging international NGOs into supporting political-military interventions or the 
use of anti-terror legislation to deny access to or interaction with certain groups and the 
populations they control.119 Our sense therefore is that organized humanitarianism, which has 
grown in parallel with contemporary forms of Western capitalism, has now reached its 
structural limits. As globalization becomes more diverse and power transfers to the East, new 
humanitarianism is itself bound to be contested and to change. 
The universality of traditional principles is also challenged within the new 
humanitarian paradigm due to the convergence of the latter with modes of power that seek to 
“contain” migration using humanitarian instruments, particularly in the context of refugee 
camps. The new humanitarianism’s entry into the exercise of modes of governance has not 
been easy, 120  as the tragedy of managing génocidaire-dominated refugee camps in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide amply demonstrated.121 These spaces of refuge may be 
“humanitarian” in a sense, but their static and semi-permanent nature means that they cannot 
be free of governance. This has led to the profusion of labels such as Mariella Pandolfi’s 
                                                        
119 Research by the Humanitarian Policy Group suggests that donor State counterterrorist polices have increased 
operating costs, slowed down administrative functions and operational responses, curtailed funding and 
undermined humanitarian partnerships. They have also prevented access and altered the quality and 
coordination of assistance, making it more difficult for humanitarian actors to operate in accordance with the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality. See Sara Pantuliano, Kate Mackintosh and Samir Elhawary with 
Victoria Metcalfe, Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Humanitarian Action: Tensions, Impacts and Ways 
Forward, HPG Policy Brief, October 2011, available at: www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7347.pdf. On the use 
of anti-terror legislation to deny assistance to proscribed groups, see Mark Bradbury and Robert Maletta, “When 
State-Building Fails: Famine, Counter-Terrorism and the Politicization of Humanitarian Action in Somalia”, in 
Antonio Donini (ed.), The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action, Kumarian 
Press, London, 2012. See also the article by Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Yvette Zegenhagen and Fauve Kurnadi in this 
issue of the Review. 
120 D. Kennedy, above note 21, p. 357. 
121 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
NY, and London, 2002. 
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“mobile sovereignty”122 and Laurence McFalls’ “Therapeutic Legitimate Domination” and 
“therapeutic governance”. 123  However, a common theme is that containment strategies 
generate their own modes of iatrogenic violence through reducing life in the camps to the 
mere maintenance of what Giorgio Agamben describes as “bare life”.124 McFalls for one 
argues that with the  
 
proliferation of threats to the survival of the species, from ethnic conflict to global 
warming, a permanent state of emergency has transformed humanitarian government 
into a dictatorship above and beyond the discussion, debates, and contestations of 
ordinary politics. To be it sure, it is a benevolent dictatorship, but it is one that 
suspends or makes obsolete political action in pursuit of a just, equitable or otherwise 
good social order.125  
 
In part this is a reflection of the broader instrumentalization of the new humanitarianism in 
this global arrangement. From the ethical foreign policy of Tony Blair through the 
“humanitarian war” launched by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 to the development of a 
“humanitarian strategy” by powers such as France in 2012 and several of Colin Powell’s 
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speeches,126 the word “humanitarian” has been hijacked, distorted and abused to describe 
everything including military intervention as legitimately humanitarian and as serving the 
protection of civilians and enforcing humanitarian access. But far from the 
humanitarianization of all forms of intervention, Western States’ pro-humanitarian 
intervention stance can be viewed as “the violent externalization of the project of liberal 
democracy under the label humanitarian intervention”,127 and whilst many NGOs are indeed 
vocal in their opposition to this process of distortion, many also conveniently and confidently 
forget or deny that a good number of them have been complicit in these processes. The new 
humanitarianism has been stretched, adapted, harnessed and used for anything and 
everything, to such a degree that is quite reasonable to ask whether it still holds any meaning 
today. In the face of repeated attacks from States, political leaders, military forces and the 
media, the new humanitarian NGOs have gradually, but definitively, lost the communications 
battle to defend the meaning of the word “humanitarian” as they understand it, and the 
greatest tragedy of all is their refusal to accept their defeat. 
Even the dramatic and apparently unburdened notion of the “humanitarian 
emergency” has been distorted to, in effect, hide the perpetrator and the nature of the 
suffering behind the suffering of the victim, depoliticizing the causes involved and converting 
the response into an essentially technical one. Henry Radice quotes James Orbinski’s Nobel 
lecture at length: 
 
                                                        
126 Colin Powell, “Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for the Leaders of Nongovernmental 
Organizations”, Washington, DC, 26 October 2001, available at: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm. 
127 Patricia Owens, “Hannah Arendt, Violence, and the Inescapable Fact of Humanity”, in Anthony F. Lang Jr 
and John Williams (eds), Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines, Palgrave, 
London, 2005. 
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The 1992 crimes against humanity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda. The 1997 massacres in Zaire. The 1999 actual attacks on civilians in 
Chechnya. These cannot be masked by terms like “Complex Humanitarian 
Emergency”, or “Internal Security Crisis”. Or by any other such euphemism – as 
though they are some random, politically undetermined event. Language is 
determinant. It frames the problem and defines response, rights and therefore 
responsibilities. It defines whether a medical or humanitarian response is adequate. 
And it defines whether a political response is inadequate. No one calls a rape a 
complex gynecologic [sic] emergency. A rape is a rape, just as a genocide is a 
genocide. And both are a crime. For MSF, this is the humanitarian act: to seek to 
relieve suffering, to seek to restore autonomy, to witness to the truth of injustice, and 
to insist on political responsibility.128 
 
The point here is not that humanitarianism is dead but that the new humanitarianism is 
incapable of defending its own boundaries in the way that traditional humanitarianism, 
consistently applied, has been able to. This point is amplified by Pierre Krähenbühl, a former 
ICRC director of operations. He argued that it “also means making a strong stand for neutral 
and independent humanitarian action. Old recipes for a different world? Not in our view 
certainly. Quite on the contrary, a principled position maintained with conviction in the face 
of challenge.”129 
                                                        
128 Henry Radice, The Responsibility to Protect as Humanitarian Negotiation: A Space for the ‘Politics of 
Humanity’?, unpublished mimeo, 2015. 
129 Pierre Krähenbühl, “Humanitarian Security: ‘A Matter of Acceptance, Perception, Behaviour…’”, address 
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The blood-soaked fields of Solferino are generally seen as the birthplace of modern organized 
humanitarian action. “Humanitarianism 1.0” was the heroic phase articulated around the 
Dunantist principles of humanity, impartiality and, at times, neutrality, as well as the 
European traditions of charity and compassion. It was volunteerist and diverse, and 
sometimes unstructured. It was also marginal in the sense that it was confined to working 
outside conflict rather than “in” or “on” it. Geopolitical changes at the end of the Cold War 
gave birth to a process of unprecedented quantitative and qualitative change: 
institutionalization, professionalization and proceduralization on the one hand, and because 
of the important governance functions that humanitarian action performs, instrumentalization 
on the other. The resulting “humanitarianism 2.0”, the new humanitarianism, was based on 
the sometimes competing “three Cs” of compassion, change and containment,130 as well as 
the “two Cs” of capitalism and coloniality. What characterized the diverse agencies that 
comprised this new humanitarian endeavour, whether they were pressed into the service of 
liberal peace or not, was the increasing institutionalization, standardization, oligopolization 
and normalization of an enterprise that remains inescapably (for now) Northern and Western. 
And of course, the software that this enterprise runs on is still, essentially, the Western code 
of coloniality through which the world is seen and interpreted from the “zero point” of the 
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West, where the colonial and capitalist endeavour started. Through it, Western knowledge of 
all kinds deems itself universal; it does not accept that it is fundamentally Eurocentric.131 
Arguably, classical humanitarianism is rooted in three broad assumptions: that there 
exists a common humanity, that the human condition is a universal one, and that it is possible 
to generate consensus on the nature and modalities of the forms of humanitarian action that 
arise from this. Whilst this article has focused mainly on the challenges to the last of these 
assumptions, each has now been challenged in fundamental ways by the rise of multiple 
humanitarianisms, whether “new”, faith-based, solidarist or non-Western versions. The 
critique of the principles followed two main lines, the first a consequentialist one relating to 
whether the specific conditions that gave rise to the principles had changed to such a degree 
that the principles no longer remained the most effective means of guaranteeing access. This 
paper has concluded that the evidence suggests the reverse of this – that the principles, 
operationalized consistently, did in fact offer the best mode of access, but at the expense of 
the broader aims of the new humanitarianism. The paper has also suggested that the version 
of humanitarianism implied by the principles did not represent an authentic and permanent 
consensus on the nature and content of humanitarianism. In this sense the process of 
questioning the principles has reflected a deeper and perpetual struggle to define the 
fundamental content of an ethic of humanity, compassion and solidarity.  
The paper has addressed the challenge of the new humanitarianism’s rights-based 
approach to the fundamental ethical core of traditional humanitarianism. It argues that this 
critique has failed to demonstrate the inadequacy of the principles in securing access. 
Foregoing neutrality in fact threatens the humanitarian access accorded to neutral 
humanitarians by warring parties and impedes these actors from assisting affected 
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populations. 132  The thrust of this paper accords with authors such as Leebaw 133  and 
Macrae, 134  who have written that the application of the rights-based approach at the 
operational level threatens the very basis upon which humanitarianism was founded. Even 
Jean Pictet has argued that “[o]ne cannot at the same time be a champion of justice and 
charity. One must choose.”135  Ultimately, traditional and new humanitarianism represent 
ethical projects that differ in their scope. In this conclusion the paper perhaps differs from 
writers such as James Darcy, 136  who advocates the “deepening” of humanitarianism to 
consider human rights implications, as well as those such as Chandler, who pushes for its 
“broadening” to incorporate more long-term development goals. 137  Traditional 
humanitarianism is far less ambitious in scope, and the belief that humanitarianism should 
uncritically embrace aspects of the human rights agenda misinterprets the intentions behind 
emergency humanitarian action and threatens access for the community as a whole.138 In 
particular, the new humanitarianism raises risks that have just as much potential to lead to 
damaging results as does a formulaic deontological adherence to principles. 
In particular, adherence to a rights-based approach risks compromising the 
universality of aid and establishing a conditionality that creates a hierarchy of “deserving” 
and “undeserving” victims, which Stockton warns has led to the “demonization of the 
undeserving disaster victim”.139 Aid policy has become increasingly linked with a range of 
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political and security objectives, and in such an environment it seems strange that the new 
humanitarianism’s attachment to a rights-based approach has the potential to claim a 
universal entitlement to certain rights but also that some rights (and therefore the needs of 
some people) are more important and more deserving than others. 140  For example, the 
controversial humanitarian response to the post-genocide refugee camps in Zaire exemplified 
a disturbing trend in ranking recipients’ rights to aid on criteria other than needs, with 
different refugee groups being deemed “worthy” or “unworthy” of humanitarian 
assistance. 141  While the idea of providing material assistance to individuals who had 
committed crimes against humanity was (and remains) morally uncomfortable, so too was the 
withholding of aid to those in need. In the context of the Hutu exodus from Rwanda in 1994, 
for example, it was inconceivable to assume that all refugees were guilty of the genocide – a 
conclusion that, if acted upon, itself constituted an egregious violation of the principle of 
humanity.142 Similar processes haunted international responses towards Serbia’s 8 million-
strong population due to alleged apathy in the face of Milošević’s atrocities in Kosovo, 
resulting in a punitive sanctions regime against Serbia and a curtailment of the impartial 
humanitarian imperative.143  
Paradoxically, proponents of a rights-based approach have also argued against relief 
aid in order to avoid the situation in which humanitarian assistance provided Western 
governments with the “appearance of doing something in the face of a tragedy while 
providing an alibi to avoid making a riskier political or military commitment that could 
address the roots of a crisis”.144 Hence, while the rights-based approach’s supposed focus on 
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the root political and social causes of conflict and poverty through long-term development 
aid145 is laudable, in practice, and more so in crisis situations, multi-mandate organizations 
find it rather difficult to operationalize both a rights-based approach and the principles of 
humanitarian action146  and have frequently promised or implied far more in the way of 
transformational assistance than they have been able to deliver. 
The increased importance of political considerations in decisions to provide aid also 
increases the potential for the humanitarian system to be manipulated in pursuit of broader 
political goals that run contrary to purely humanitarian considerations. Most prominent on 
this list is the risk that humanitarianism can justify military action. David Chandler,147 Joanna 
Macrae148 and David Reiff149 all argue that the rights-based approach to humanitarian action 
sets a dangerous precedent, pointing to military campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. On a lesser scale, Marc DuBois, former head of MSF UK, argues that the rights-based 
approach contributes to a “delusion” that humanitarianism can offer more ambitious forms of 
protection; it represents itself as a saving idea, but it is one that ultimately cannot save.150 
The final challenge is that the new humanitarianism fundamentally confuses the issue 
of who holds rights and obligations in the international system. In a system of States, only 
States and not NGOs can ever truly be the duty bearers in upholding human rights, as stated 
inter alia by Darcy,151 Stockton152 and Leebaw.153 The role of the humanitarian community is 
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not to usurp these rights. Even within the camp of the classical humanitarians, few deny the 
importance of solidarity, compassion, the promotion of human rights, and developmental or 
peacebuilding agendas – but they do not see these as their role. They remain committed to the 
sense that there are circumstances in which protecting and saving lives is a valuable objective 
in itself, and humanitarian principles remain the most pragmatic way of doing so. In such a 
context, there is clearly a role for solidarity with victims and for the promotion of human 
rights, but not in a traditional humanitarian guise. 
Whilst humanitarianism has perhaps always been the product of the expansion of 
Western values and economic power, the neoliberal capitalist system, building on its colonial 
past, has colonized the new humanitarianism. The new humanitarianism has led the sector 
into the troubled waters of instrumentalization, to levels hitherto unseen. Similarly, given the 
ways in which beneficiaries in the global South are often uncomfortable with the intrinsic 
coloniality of Western humanitarianism, and given the emergence of both non-Western 
approaches amongst new donors (statist, Eastphalian, etc.) and the increasing significance of 
rejectionists such as Islamic State, the best chances of access and effective humanitarian 
action are provided by adherence to traditional humanitarian principles. 
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